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Abstract 
Embryogenesis, the process by which an organism forms and develops, has long been and still is a major 
field of investigation in the natural sciences. By which means, which forces, are embryonic cells and 
tissues assembled, deformed, and eventually organized into an animal? Because embryogenesis deeply 
questions our understanding of the mechanisms of life, it has motivated many scientific theories and 
philosophies over the course of history. While genetics now seems to have emerged as a natural 
background to study embryogenesis, it was intuited long ago that it should also rely on mechanical forces 
and on the physical properties of cells and tissues. In the early 20th century, Stéphane Leduc proposed that 
biology was merely a subset of fluid physics, and argued that biology should focus on how forces act on 
living matter. Rejecting vitalism and life-specific approaches, he designed naïve experiments based on 
osmosis and diffusion to mimic shapes and phenomena found in living systems, in order to identify 
physical mechanisms that could support the development of the embryo. While Leduc’s ideas then had 
some impact in the field, notably on later acclaimed D’Arcy Thompson, they fell into oblivion during the 
later 20th century. In this article I give an overview of Stéphane Leduc’s physical approach to life, and show 
that the paradigm that he introduced, although long forsaken, becomes more and more topical today, as 
developmental biology increasingly turns to physics and self-organization theories to study the 
mechanisms of embryogenesis. His story, I suggest, bears witness to our reluctance to abandon life-
specific approaches in biology. 
 
 
Introduction 
Understanding how living organisms develop and 
organize during the embryonic period has always 
been, and remains, a major challenge of the natural 
sciences. Two main paradigms have long opposed to 
explain the development of the embryo. Epigenesis 
refers to the process by which organisms develop from 
a seed or an egg, and assumes that over the course of 
development, the embryo progressively acquires new 
parts, forms new organs and complexifies, to 
eventually become a formed animal. The theory of 
preformation, on the opposite, assumed that 
organisms grow by simple deployment of already pre-
existing structures, and thus develop from a miniature 
version of themselves. Epigenesis was the prevalent 
theory until the 17th century, and the first observations 
of spermatozoa by Leeuwenhoek (Leeuwenhoek 
1677). After that the epigenesis became harder to 
defend: how could complex animals develop from 
structures as simple as sperm cells? Rather, it was 
proposed that preformed miniature animals should be 
already present in the reproductive cells, either female 
(ovism) or male (animalculism). From the 17th to 19th 
century, the theory of preformation would thus prevail 
over epigenesis. Importantly, preformation was also 
supported by the Christian Church: as the creator of all 
things, God created all men (and animals), including 
their miniature descendants inside them, themselves 
carrying their descendants, etc. Diderot and 
D’Alembert’s Encyclopedia gives a flavor of the state 
of the art in the mid-18th century. Under Génération 
(Physiologie), the authors present ovism and 
animalculism as the two main theories of 
embryogenesis (D’Alembert, Mallet and d’Aumont 
1757). “The two theories of generation […], the theory 
of eggs, as containing rudiments of the fetus, and that 
of spermatic worms, as forming these rudiments 
themselves, have divided almost all physicists since 
about a century”. Still, later in the article they mention 
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epigenetic theories, such as that of Maupertuis, based 
on attraction: “A few modern physicists sought to find 
in the opinions of ancients more satisfying 
explanations about the mystery of generation. The 
author of the Venus Physique proposed to come back 
to the mixture of the two semens, that from the woman, 
and that from the man; and to account for the result of 
this mixture, he relies on attraction: why, he says, if this 
force exists in nature, should it be absent from the 
generation of animals? If there are in each of these 
semens parts meant to form the heart, the gut, the 
head, the arms, the legs, and that these parts each 
have a greater attraction to the part which should be its 
neighbor in the formation of the animal, the fetus will 
form.” Having described the rich panel of theories of 
generation, the authors conclude: “we do not need 
more to prove that the mystery on this subject is 
impenetrable in nature.” About fifty years later, at the 
beginning of the 19th century, Heinz Christian Pander, 
a German embryologist studying the chick embryo, 
discovered the existence of germ layers, distinct 
regions of the early embryo that later give rise to 
distinct tissues and organs (Pander 1817). His work 
was continued by Karl Ernst Von Baer, who expanded 
the germ layer concept to all vertebrates (Von Baer 
1828). This discovery, together with the progressive 
development of the cell theory in the mid-19th century, 
clearly favored epigenesis, and sounded the death 
knell of preformationism –at least in its old, literal form. 
But despite careful observation of developing 
embryos, epigenesis lacked a convincing causal 
mechanism for the organization of the initial mass of 
cells into an adult animal. In the absence of a robust 
theory of embryonic organization, many natural 
philosophers assumed the existence of a vital force, a 
life-specific vitalis responsible for the organization and 
complexification of the embryo throughout its 
development (for a short review, see Betchel and 
Richardson 1998). Such a vital force conveniently 
filled the theoretical gap of epigenesis, but also relied 
on the idea that life was irreducible to purely physical 
and chemical laws, and in that respect remained 
compatible with spirituality. However by the end of the 
19th century, and later in the early 20th century, a vast 
majority of biologists would progressively abandon 
vitalism, and rather seek for deterministic, testable 
mechanisms of embryogenesis. Since then, a major 
axis of biology has become to identify these 
mechanisms by studying the behavior of cells and 
tissues, and more recently, of genes. Indeed, in the 
second half of the 20th century it was shown that our 
genes, by controlling cell behavior and eventually cell 
fate, could regulate development and dramatically 
affect embryogenesis. Today, genetics has, without a 
doubt, become the prevalent framework to study the 
mechanisms of embryogenesis. 
Yet at the beginning of the 20th century, a few attempts 
at providing a theoretical framework to epigenesis 
were made. Following Lamarck’s idea that life should 
stem from physical and chemical principles only, 
German chemist Moritz Traube initiated a series of 
attempts at creating “artificial cells” at the end of the 
19th century (Traube 1866). His works influenced 
many, notably the chemists Denis Monnier and Carl 
Vogt, with their work on the artificial production of 
organic forms (Monnier and Vogt 1882). About twenty 
years later, at the beginning of the 20th century, French 
physician Stéphane Leduc turned this emergent field 
of investigation into a proposal for a paradigm shift in 
biology. Not only he defended that life was a purely 
physical phenomenon, and that no life-specific 
principle, no vital force, should exist; but he also 
proposed that both apparition of life and 
embryogenesis should result from the intrinsic power 
of organization of physical forces, with the idea that 
physical interactions should be able to organize matter 
in a spontaneous fashion, in living organisms just as in 
the inert world. And to support his theory, Leduc took 
the artificial synthesis of life-like elements one step 
further, and developed synthetic experiments from 
purely physical ingredients, in which he mimicked a 
variety of shapes and phenomena only observed in 
living organisms: cellularization, cell division and 
karyokinesis, plant-like growth, seashell-like 
crystallization, etc. 
Touching too closely to the question of spontaneous 
generation, Leduc’s work was excluded from the 
reports of the French Académie des Sciences, and 
was largely forgotten later in the 20th century. Most of 
the credit of introducing a physical approach to 
biological morphogenesis rather went to D’Arcy 
Thompson, although he made extensive use Leduc’s 
work in On Growth and Form (Thompson 1917, p. 
293, p.297, p.324, p.500-503, p.660, p.664, p.854). At 
best, Leduc was remembered for his amusing bio-
mimetic experiments, or for having first used the term 
“synthetic biology”. Yet his approach makes a great 
deal of sense in regard of modern physics and of the 
most recent advances of developmental biology. The 
physics of morphogenesis has greatly developed in the 
second half of the 20th century, and elucidated many 
mechanisms of spontaneous organization in solids, 
fluids, sand, and other so-called complex systems; 
showing that simple rules of interactions between the 
parts of a system could spontaneously generate 
complex, organized patterns in a robust manner. 
These discoveries, which led to the modern concepts 
of emergence and self-organization, are more and 
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more applied to living systems. And today, 
developmental biology, the modern science of 
embryogenesis, increasingly turns to physics and self-
organization to identify mechanisms of organization 
and morphogenesis during embryonic development.  
 
In this article I will give an overview of Leduc’s 
theoretical work, and of his related experiments. I will 
analyze the proximity of his ideas to the concepts of 
emergence and self-organization, which today begin to 
pervade the field of developmental biology. I will 
discuss the paradoxical oblivion of physical 
approaches such as Leduc’s to problems of living 
organization in the 20th century, and in particular during 
the genetics era. I suggest that our reluctance to 
abandon the “vital exception” has played a major role 
in this process, and that recent developments of 
embryogenesis might prefigure a paradigm shift, as 
advocated by Leduc at the beginning of the 20th 
century. 
 
 
Overview of Leduc’s work 
Stéphane Armand Nicolas Leduc (1853-1939, Figure 
1) was first trained in the physical sciences, and then 
defended a thesis of medicine in 1883. He became a 
general practitioner and was granted a chair of medical 
physics in the city of Nantes, France. As a doctor in the 
1880’s, he dealt with the epidemics cholera and 
typhoid, and worked on public health issues such as 
clean water and sewage systems. In parallel, he 
carried out medical research in various fields, from 
electrophysiology to radiotherapy (Drouin et al. 2014). 
Only later, at the onset of the 20th century, did he 
develop his new ideas about biological organization, in 
the essentially nonexistent context of biophysics. Most 
notably, and in addition to numerous articles and 
conferences published before the exclusion of his work 
from the French academy of sciences, he published 
three books related to embryogenesis and biological 
organization: Théorie Physico-chimique de la Vie et 
Générations Spontanées (Leduc, 1910), revised and 
re-edited in english as The Mechanism of Life (Leduc 
1911), La Biologie Synthétique (Leduc 1912), and 
later Enérgétique de la Vie (Leduc 1921). In these 
books Leduc exposed in details his physical theory of 
life, a few years before D’Arcy Thompson published 
the acclaimed On Growth and Form (Thompson 
1917). The theoretical side of Leduc’s work deals with 
epistemological considerations on the physical nature 
of life, and the practical consequences it should have 
on the study of life phenomena. In particular Leduc 
deplores the “mysticism” of his colleagues and 
advocates the use of physical methods in biology. The 
experimental side of his work consists in bio-mimetic 
experiments that illustrate his physical theory of life. He 
introduces “synthetic biology,” the synthesis by 
osmosis and diffusion of shapes strikingly similar to 
that of living systems, and argues that such physical 
mechanisms might be good candidates for both 
morphogenesis –the organization of the embryo during 
its development– and biogenesis –the emergence of 
life. 
 
Figure 1 – Stéphane Leduc (1853-1939) 
 
Theory - Leduc’s obsession in adopting a new physical 
paradigm clearly demonstrates that he positioned 
himself in a theoretical frame of biology. In his 
Synthetic Biology, he insists on the scientific necessity 
of having theoretical guidelines, particularly in biology: 
“The absence of a general theory of life greatly harms 
the progress of biology” (Leduc 1912, chapter 2). Like 
Ernst Haeckel, whom he greatly admires, Leduc thinks 
that Lamarck deserves a place beside Darwin in the 
history of evolution (Leduc 1911, p.164, citing 
Haeckel), and it is in particular the theoretical 
motivations of Lamarck that strike Leduc: “It is with the 
idea that nothing is more hindering than the absence 
of a general theory that Lamarck edified his theory of 
evolution” (Leduc 1912, chapter 2).  Indeed, Lamarck 
introduced the first theory of evolution as a theoretical 
necessity, the spontaneous generation of higher 
organisms being impossible, it was required that 
simpler organisms could evolve, diversify and 
complexify over generations. Lamarck also tried to 
explain how they could do so in his transformist theory 
(Lamarck 1809, part 1 - chapter 7), which as we know 
today was proven inexact. Fifty years later, the theory 
of evolution was corrected by Charles Darwin, who 
introduced natural selection of characters as the 
central mechanism for the evolution of species 
(Darwin 1859). Yet it is the theoretical achievement by 
Lamarck of even postulating evolution that Leduc 
admires, more than Darwin’s answer to how they do 
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so: “If the transformist theory of evolution is 
abandoned, it yet remains a powerful agent of progress 
[…]; and its authors, pioneers and heroes” (Leduc 
1912, chapter 2). Leduc’s work on morphogenesis is 
in essence dedicated to fill the theoretical gap of 
epigenesis, gap largely left unfilled by Darwin’s theory 
of evolution. Darwin was indeed surprisingly reluctant 
to discuss the origin of life, as pointed out by Ernst 
Haeckel: “The chief defect of the Darwinian theory is 
that it throws no light on the origin of the primitive 
organism –probably a simple cell– from which all the 
others have descended. When Darwin assumes a 
special creative act for this first species, he is not 
consistent, and, I think, not quite sincere” (Haeckel 
1962). Leduc thus addresses the question of the origin 
of life from inorganic ingredients, which in his mind 
should be intimately related to the mechanisms 
underlying the organization of the embryo: “The 
Darwinian theory shows how acquired variations are 
transmitted and accentuated by natural selection, but 
it says nothing as to how these variations may be 
acquired. In the same way we are in entire ignorance 
as to the physical mechanism of ontogenetic 
development, the evolution of the embryo” (Leduc 
1911, p.167). 
Experiments - Like several theoretical biologists of his 
time (Edward Schäfer, Jacques Loeb, Alfonso Herrera, 
to name a few), Stéphane Leduc defended a 
mechanistic conception of life, and therefore 
advocated the use of physical methods in the life 
sciences. He vividly and repeatedly insisted that 
“physicism” should replace “mysticism” in biology: 
“Two methods exist to explain nature’s phenomena: 
mysticism and physicism. Physicism is the method of 
the physical sciences, mysticism still prevails in 
biology” (Leduc 1912, chapter 1). With that said, 
Leduc attempted to make biology synthetic: “Until now, 
biology relied on observation and analysis only. The 
use of observation and analysis, without a synthetic 
methodology, is one of the causes that delay the 
progress of biology. The analytic method in biology is 
paralyzed, sterilized, by the indissoluble unity of 
phenomena: if, in a living system, one tries to isolate a 
phenomenon from the others, the phenomenon 
disappears, the animal dies. Not only the synthetic 
method is applicable to biology as it is for other 
sciences, but it seems to be the most fertile, the most 
capable to reveal the physical mechanisms of life, the 
study of which has not yet begun. When a 
phenomenon, in a living organism, has been observed, 
and that one believes to understand its physical 
mechanism, one should be able to reproduce this 
phenomenon separately, outside of the living 
organism” (Leduc 1912, chapter 2). Leduc thus 
designed experiments in order to mimic behaviors and 
shapes found in living systems from purely physical 
and chemical ingredients. 
 
 
 
Figure 2 – Growth figures (Leduc 1912). A. Artificial karyokinesis 
obtained by diffusion in a saline solution. B. Artificial plant-like 
osmotic growth. C. Artificial osmotic shells. D. Artificial segmentation 
in a solution of nitrate potassium. 
 
 
Among several other techniques, Leduc extensively 
utilized principles of diffusion and osmosis, to show 
that shape emergence as seen in the living world was 
indeed within the reach of the physical and chemical 
forces alone. Most of Leduc’s work on morphogenesis 
is based on the spontaneous osmotic growth of salts 
of heavy metals in liquid solutions such as sodium 
silicate (or liquid glass). Chemical precipitation occurs 
at the interface between the salt and the liquid glass, 
forming a semi-permeable membranes, an artificial 
“cell” enclosing the crystals. Then osmotic pressure 
tends to equilibrate the salt concentration on both sides 
of the semi-permeable membrane, which results in 
water flowing inside the cavity. At some point, pressure 
exerted by water inside the cavity breaks the 
membrane, and the salt trapped inside is released in 
the surrounding solution for a short period of time, until 
a new membrane forms by precipitation. The repetition 
of this process causes the crystal to slowly grow in the 
solution. Depending on the type of crystal, the 
concentration of the solutions, and the concentration 
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gradients used to prepare the water glass medium, a 
great variety of patterns and growth types can be 
obtained, which, Leduc showed, can be strikingly 
similar to simple life forms or phenomena (Figure 2).  
 
Although the physical and chemical mechanisms 
underlying osmotic growth are now well understood 
(Cartwright et al. 2002, Barge et al. 2015), Leduc’s 
experimental skill in creating such shapes remains 
unmatched. The spontaneous organization of Leduc 
osmotic creations into life-like forms such as plants, 
fungi, shells, or cells, and into life-like events such as 
branching, karyokinesis, or cellular segmentation, 
supported his view that physical forces alone are 
sufficient to organize living matter. His spectacular 
experimental achievements, as compared to other 
theorists advocating synthetic biology, such as Loeb or 
Schäfer, definitely contributed to build Leduc’s 
influence in the early 1900s. Beyond shape similarities, 
Leduc attributed a variety of physiologic functions, 
such as nutrition (transformation of an external source 
of energy into organized shape changes), growth, or 
reproduction, to his osmotic structures: “Evolution, 
nutrition, sensibility, growth, organization, none of 
these, not even the faculty of reproduction is the 
appanage of life” (Leduc 1911, p.xiii). And beyond 
embryogenesis, Leduc proposed that the chemical 
criteria for such osmotic growth might have been met 
in the early ages of earth, and that such processes 
might have driven the spontaneous appearance of life 
on earth: “Is it possible to doubt that the simple 
conditions which produce an osmotic growth have 
frequently been realized during the past ages of the 
earth?” (Leduc 1911 p.144). 
 
 
Leduc, vitalism, and spontaneous generation 
 
Leduc’s theory was questioning the very nature of life. 
It is one thing to accept that life should stem from 
physical and chemical principles, but Leduc took that 
belief a step further, with the idea that none of these 
principles should be specific to life. While he candidly 
asked the question as to whether these osmotic forms 
might be considered as alive, his detractors mocked 
the pale imitation that they were, evocating for instance 
“a resemblance as superficial as that between a 
person and his marble image” (Oparin 1938, p.56). 
Yet, Leduc’s question was not that naïve. Until now no 
definition of life can be given, since defining life 
requires a purely arbitrary line between living and inert, 
on a basis which is actually more ideological than 
scientific. Many characters that we intuitively associate 
with life, such as growth, death, transformation of an 
external income of energy into shape changes, 
homeostasis, or replication are indeed not specific to 
life, and can be found in systems widely considered as 
inorganic. The transition between inorganic, inert 
objects and living, organic objects is rather continuous 
than sudden, and therefore difficult, if not impossible, 
to characterize. This was coined by Leduc in perfectly 
simple terms: “Since we cannot distinguish the line 
between life and the rest of nature’s phenomena, we 
should conclude that this line does not exist, which 
satisfies the law of continuity between all phenomena” 
(Leduc 1910, p.14). “Life is difficult to define because 
it differs from one living being to another; the life of a 
man is not that of a polyp or of a plant, and if we find it 
impossible to discover the line which separates life 
from the other phenomena of Nature, it is in fact 
because no such line of demarcation exists. The 
passage from animate to inanimate is gradual and 
insensible” (Leduc 1911, p.xiii). Thus, one can 
understand Leduc’s point when he asked whether 
osmotic structures displaying growth (and growth 
arrest), segmentation, or internal fluid circulation might 
be called “alive”. 
 
And trying to narrow or even suppress the gap 
between animate and inanimate, Leduc met fierce 
vitalist resistance, or at least a reluctance to abandon 
the vital exception. The epigenetic theory of 
embryogenesis lacking a theoretical basis, the idea 
that a vital force could support the organization of 
embryos had long been a most convenient one; in fact 
since Caspar Friedriech Wolff’s, considered as one of 
the founders of modern embryology, introduced the 
concept of a formative vital force he called vis 
essentialis (Wolff 1759). The scientific role of the vital 
force in the late 18th and in the 19th century, can in 
some respects be compared to that of ether, the 
versatile physical entity supposed to support gravity or 
light propagation in vacuum. In short, a convenient 
medium accounting for interactions beyond our 
understanding, and possibly tinged with ideology and 
spirituality. Interestingly, Wolff declared that “all 
believers of epigenesis are vitalists”. Since epigenesis, 
unlike preformation, implied that God had not 
preformed all animals, vitalism was also a way to 
rescue epigenesis from miscreance. And while vitalism 
no longer was the dominant doctrine a hundred years 
later, vitalism was still very much present in the life 
sciences, at least in an insidious form. According to 
Leduc: “Mankind increasingly replaces conjuration to 
gods by efforts of reason. Almost alone, biologists and 
physicians still conjure up mysterious forces. Old 
anthropomorphism, finalism, supernatural, 
metaphysical, extra and ultra-scientific persists in the 
life sciences, under various forms and with various 
intensity. One admits there principles that are beyond 
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matter, a vital force specific to life, and the finalism is 
met everywhere. Education in this regard is such that, 
even the works that claim the physico-chemical nature 
of life are sprinkled of vitalist interpretations and finalist 
explanations. The phenomena of life are considered 
with authentic superstition, it is a sacrilege to try and 
interpret them, and doing so with the methods of 
physicism, one rises the most violent oppositions” 
(Leduc 1912, chapter 1). And indeed vitalism was far 
from extinct. Louis Pasteur, for instance, considered 
fermentation to be irreducible to ordinary chemistry, 
and therefore a vital phenomenon (Pasteur 1879). 
Hans Driesch, a German embryologist, having 
observed that isolated pieces of blastomeres could 
develop into complete embryos, supposed that this 
developmental persistence was irreducible to 
mechanistic explanations and invoked an autonomous 
principle he called entelechy (see for example the 
Gifford lectures, Driesch 1908). French philosopher 
Henri Bergson, in his Creative Evolution, introduced 
his own concept of “élan vital” or “vital impetus”; and 
attacked synthetic approaches such as that of Leduc. 
Without naming him explicitly, Bergson describes his 
work in harsh terms (Bergson 1907, p21-23). 
“Imitation of the living by the unorganized may, 
however, go a good way. Not only does chemistry 
make organic syntheses, but we have succeeded in 
reproducing artificially the external appearance of 
certain facts of organization, such as indirect cell 
division and protoplasmic circulation. […] But scientists 
are far from agreed on the value of explanations of this 
sort. Chemists have pointed out that even in the 
organic – not to go so far as the organized– science 
has reconstructed hitherto nothing but waste products 
of vital activity”. Then Bergson enthusiastically refers 
to the words of Edmund Beecher Wilson, an American 
cell biologist: “The study of the cell has, on the whole, 
seemed to widen rather than narrow the enormous gap 
that separates even the lowest forms of life from the 
inorganic world”. Leduc denied the existence of such a 
gap, and on the opposite was very attached to the “law 
of continuity” between all phenomena. Hence he 
insisted that life phenomena should not be studied 
differently than physical phenomena: “Life is a purely 
physical phenomenon, produced by the same forces, 
ruled by the same laws that govern the non-living 
world” (Leduc, 1912, chapter 2). Hence, “the problem 
of biology is to understand how physical forces act on 
living matter” (Leduc, 1912, chapter 3). 
And to replace the “mysticism” of vitalism, Leduc called 
upon the inherent power of organization of physical 
interactions: “The ordinary physical forces have in fact 
a power of organization infinitely greater than has been 
hitherto supposed by the boldest imagination” (Leduc 
1911, p.167). This concept of physical spontaneous 
organization, as introduced both theoretically and 
experimentally by Leduc, is remarkably similar to the 
later concepts of emergence and self-organization, 
which proved to be powerful physical frameworks for 
the understanding of pattern formation, both in the 
living and non-living worlds. Importantly, Leduc’s 
theory of living self-organization is much distinct from 
pre-existing principles proposed by earlier epigenists, 
such as Caspar Friedrich Wolff’s vis essentialis (“the 
very power through which, in the vegetable body, all 
those things which we describe as life are effected”, 
see Gigante 2009, p.19) or Johann Friedrich 
Blumenbach’s bildungstrieb (powers that “are not 
referrible to any qualities merely physical, physical or 
mechanical”, see Gigante 2009, p.16). Although these 
are enunciated as autonomous principles, they rather 
remain avatars of a vital force. Emmeche et al. wrote 
that "there is a very important difference between the 
vitalists and the emergentists: the vitalist's creative 
forces were relevant only in organic substances, not in 
inorganic matter. Emergence hence is creation of new 
properties regardless of the substance involved". Later 
they conclude that "the assumption of an extra-
physical vitalis (vital force, entelechy, élan vital, etc.), 
as formulated in most forms (old or new) of vitalism, is 
usually without any genuine explanatory power” 
(Emmeche et al.1997). Clearly Leduc’s concept of 
physical organization is much closer to emergentism 
(or self-organization), and his experiments were 
designed to prove that indeed no specific force is 
required to organize living systems, since the ordinary 
physical forces possess this very power of 
organization. And as naïve or over-interpreted as they 
are, his experiments still proved that physical 
interactions could spontaneously organize non-trivial 
shape changes, in a manner that can at least resemble 
life, and even “deceive the very elect”, as written by 
Deane Butcher in his preface to Leduc’s Mechanism of 
Life (Leduc 1911, p.viii): “There is, I think, no more 
wonderful and illuminating spectacle than that of an 
osmotic growth,—a crude lump of brute inanimate 
matter germinating before our very eyes, putting forth 
bud and stem and root and branch and leaf and fruit, 
with no stimulus from germ or seed, without even the 
presence of organic matter”. For Leduc, this was a 
proof of principle that the laws of physics should be 
sufficient to organize matter into life, both for the 
development of a single organism, and for the 
appearance of life on earth. With a certain logic, Leduc 
called this self-organization “spontaneous generation”, 
and argued that such spontaneous generation is 
required in the theory of evolution: “The chain of life is 
of necessity a continuous one, from the mineral at one 
end to the most complicated organism at the other. We 
cannot allow that it is broken at any point, or that there 
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is a link missing between animate and inanimate 
nature. Hence the theory of evolution necessarily 
admits the physico-chemical nature of life and the fact 
of spontaneous generation” (Leduc 1911, p.15). In 
short, “without the idea of spontaneous generation and 
a physical theory of life, the doctrine of evolution is a 
mutilated hypothesis without unity or cohesion” (Leduc 
1911, p.164). However, Pasteur’s experiments in 
sealed bottles had just ended the academic debate 
that set he and Pouchet in vivid opposition about the 
spontaneous generation of life from inorganic 
materials, showing that such generation could not 
occur if proper precautions were taken. And yet Leduc 
insisted that the issue of spontaneous generation had 
not been settled, for it eventually was that of the origin 
of life: “The question of spontaneous generation exists, 
and it’s not in the power of anyone to suppress it. It is 
stupefying that Pasteur’s experiments could extinguish 
it so completely for more than thirty years” (Leduc 
1912, chapter 15). As discussed above, what Leduc 
called spontaneous generation was largely different 
from the spontaneous generation defended by 
Pouchet as dismissed by Pasteur, and rather akin to 
an autonomous physical organization. Even though it 
precisely covered the concept Leduc wanted to 
designate, the use of the terminology of “spontaneous 
generation”, proved to be a regrettable choice. As 
Dean Butcher mentioned in his preface to The 
Mechanism of Life, to explain the reasons of Leduc’s 
exclusion from the reports of French Académie des 
Sciences, his writings “touched too closely on the 
burning question of spontaneous generation”. Leduc 
himself wrote that “in 1907 the Académie des Sciences 
de Paris excluded from its Comptes Rendus the report 
of my researches on diffusion and osmosis, because it 
raised the question of spontaneous generation”. One 
might argue that Leduc, being aware of the 
controversy, should have insisted less on the concept 
of spontaneous generation. But the global dismiss of 
spontaneous generation was precisely a persistence 
of the vitalism he fought, exactly because in his opinion 
a theory of spontaneous generation was required to 
get past the vital exception. This recklessness might 
also indicate yet another reason for the rejection of 
Leduc’s work. One can sense from his bold writing 
style that he did like to shock the reader and oppose 
the mainstream. On several occasions he mocks the 
methods or beliefs of his colleagues in rather harsh 
words. I suggest this bears witness to his tendency to 
consider himself as a misunderstood avant-gardist. 
Clearly, Leduc had a special admiration for men whose 
ideas were so innovative that they were rejected by 
their contemporaries. On multiple occasions, he cites 
Galilée, Christophe Colomb, Giordano Bruno, or other 
such men, and there is little doubt that he likes to 
consider himself as one of them: “The explorer of the 
unknown must be aware that, leaving the most used 
routes, where rich cities and comfortable areas can be 
found […], he will find solitude. If there he meets other 
minds, they can be nothing but an elite, and would 
cease to be an elite if they became the majority […]. 
Ignored great men, in their understanding of what is 
universally misunderstood, have a motive a supreme 
pride” (Leduc 1912, chapter 16). One can only 
hypothesize that such an attitude, coupled to his 
extreme disregard of traditional methods used in 
biology (which he refers to as mysticism!), might have 
facilitated the rejection of his already marginal work by 
his peers. 
 
And indeed, Leduc is almost absent from modern 
scientific literature, even though his ideas were quite 
debated in his time, in France and abroad. In 
comparison with France, Leduc’s reception in the 
English and American scientific press, while mitigated, 
turned out to be more sympathetic (see Keller’s 
detailed analysis, Keller 2002, p.29-35). If some 
commenters were dubious about some of Leduc’s 
conclusions, his assertion that vital phenomena should 
originate from basic physical principles “tapped a nerve 
that was very much alive in the English speaking 
world,” as coined by Keller. Leduc, while often mocking 
the “frozen” erudition of French scientists, had great 
consideration for the “country of liberty” (England) and 
for the Anglo-American people, a fertile ground for “the 
birth and development of new ideas” (Leduc 1912, 
p.ix). It is then no surprise that Leduc, with the help of 
Deane Butcher, published his Mechanism of Life in 
English in 1912. Yet, abroad just as in France, Leduc’s 
work was soon forgotten and lost most of its influence. 
As suggested by Evelyn Fox Keller, the threat of 
vitalism had almost disappeared, and the subsequent 
necessity for a physical theory of life had become 
accordingly less urgent (Keller 2002, p.48). After the 
advent of genetics, and during most of the 20th century, 
physical approaches to embryogenesis almost 
disappeared from the life sciences. Yet, the idea that 
physical interactions possess a power of organization 
susceptible to organize living matter has made its way 
to the life sciences and echoes in the most recent 
advances of developmental biology. In the following, I 
will first discuss the decline of physical approaches 
inherited from Leduc or D’Arcy Thompson during the 
20th century’s genetics era; then the recent 
developments of developmental biology that are 
leading to what, I suggest, might be called their 
rehabilitation. 
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Leduc and modern biology 
 
The development of genetics since the discovery of 
DNA structure in 1953 (Watson and Crick 1953) 
transformed our conception of life. It also provided new 
and powerful tools for the study of the mechanisms of 
life and of embryogenesis. With the astonishing 
discovery of a molecular basis underlying the 
regulation of embryonic development, genes were 
soon considered the elementary blocks of life; and with 
the technological development of molecular tools, 
biology soon became focused on the decryption of the 
genetic code and its regulation of cellular processes. 
This shift towards a genetic view of life is first 
exemplified by the methods now used in biology, 
almost exclusively turned to molecular and genetic 
tools. Second and equally important, the gene has 
become a cultural icon of life and everything related to 
it: disease of course, but also behavior, personhood, 
identity, skill, etc. The gene, and the genetic 
determinism associated to it, are now part of the 
popular culture, to be found in novels, movies, 
cartoons, or video games. And this process has been 
continuously fed by science: every week or so we hear 
of a new gene that has been shown to affect autism, 
depression, obesity, sexuality. The widespread use of 
–originally– metaphoric expressions, such as the 
“genetic program” our genes assemble into, or that our 
genome is the “book of life”, bears witness to the deep 
anchorage of the gene mystique into the collective 
imagination. It has now been a century or so that 
biology has rejected vitalist theories, and yet it is 
striking how vitalistic these expressions sound. Clearly 
the rapid spread of the genetic terminology has to do 
with its simplicity and its specificity to life phenomena: 
in the absence of a defining feature of life, we naturally 
welcomed genes as the underlying basis of life-specific 
traits, basis that could carry all the information specific 
to an individual, including a human individual. As 
coined by Jean-Jacques Kupiec, geneticist and 
epistemologist (Kupiec 2002, interview to Ecorev’): 
“Biology has not made its Copernican revolution yet”; 
in the sense that the vital exception, which underlies 
our own human specificity, remains at the center of 
biology. The scientific and popular success of the gene 
mystique bears witness to our reluctance to give up on 
this specificity, and accordingly to our eagerness to 
adopt scientific and cultural frameworks that preserve 
it. As Kupiec said, “Genetics is not a scientific theory 
anymore, it’s an indeology” (Kupiec 2002). This 
unrestrained scientific and popular geneticization of life 
can be considered, I suggest, as a new form of 
vitalism, in the sense that genes replaced the vital 
force that bestowed life its precious specificity. This is 
perfectly exemplified by James Watson’s formula: “We 
used to think our fate was in our stars; now we know, 
in large measure, our fate is in our genes”. 
 
In that context it is not that surprising that genetics 
eclipsed most of the other approaches to life sciences, 
a fortiori the fundamentally unspecific physical 
approaches. Yet this came to a price. While 
succeeding in identifying causal cascades (e.g. without 
this or that gene, a modification of the phenotype is 
observed), a purely genetic approach often fails to 
identify mechanisms that link gene expression to 
physical traits. Genome sequencing, considered at the 
time of the Human Genome Project as a huge step 
towards our understanding of life phenomena, has left 
a somewhat bitter taste to the scientific community. If 
anything, it showed that the genome is not the book of 
life. The editorial of Nature’s special “Human genome 
at ten”, published ten years after the sequencing 
(Nature editorial, 2011), bore the self-explanatory title 
“Best is yet to come”. The distance between promises 
and achievements reflected the fact that “the project 
was a triumph of technological capability rather than 
scientific understanding” (Ball 2010). Philipp Ball, 
editor for the Nature journal and scientific writer, wrote 
in an article written for Prospect Magazine: “[An] 
unfortunate notion behind the Human Genome Project 
was that science can be done without hypotheses or 
ideas.” Ball then quotes Jim Collins of Boston 
University, whom he refers to as “one of the few 
biologists to see a bigger picture”: “We’ve made the 
mistake of equating the gathering of information with a 
corresponding increase in insight and understanding” 
(Ball 2010). And indeed, the massive amount of data 
provided by the Human Genome Project is hard to 
exploit without a more general theoretical framework. 
 
Hence Sonigo, Kupiec, and others, predict that the 
difficulties met by the genetic paradigm prefigure a 
paradigm shift, the “Copernican revolution” mentioned 
earlier. Very much like the shift proposed by Stéphane 
Leduc, this revolution requires a more general 
theoretical framework, unbiased by the specificity of 
life. Several clues indicate that we might be already 
witnessing the forerunners of this shift. First, 
quantitative tools, physical methods, and modelling –
the “physicism” advocated by Leduc– have literally 
invaded biology over the last few years. Second, and 
maybe more importantly, biology increasingly turns to 
general concepts of physical self-organization to 
decipher actual mechanisms of emergence, 
integrating to our understanding of embryogenesis the 
“power of organization of physical forces” coined by 
Leduc. 
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In the field of embryogenesis, several gaps in the 
purely genetic paradigm might have facilitated its loss 
of impetus, and conversely the advent of more general 
physical concepts. Genetic patterning of the embryo, 
as crucial as it is, cannot alone provide actual 
mechanisms of shape formation without physical 
considerations. How can shapes be generated by 
homogeneous or non-homogeneous growth? How is 
shape generation impacted by the mechanical nature 
of living tissues? Is there any crosstalk between 
mechanical state and genetic regulation? How do 
shape boundaries, by limiting diffusion, feedback on 
genetic patterning, which relies on the physical 
diffusion of proteins? The global description of the 
feedback between shape, gene regulation, and growth 
requires a physical backdrop; and eventually the 
framework of embryonic development has to be the 
physics of its constitutive elements, such as cells and 
tissues. Even though interactions between these 
elements can be mediated by genes, they have to be 
translated into physical units of growth, shrinkage, 
motion, flows, etc. Equally important, shapes can 
appear in biological systems independent of genetic 
regulation, because physical interactions are 
morphogenetic in essence. Everywhere inorganic, 
geneless systems demonstrate the morphogenetic 
power inherent to the physical laws of interactions. 
There is of course no reason that such self-organized 
morphogenesis should be absent from life 
phenomena, and in particular it should be of crucial 
importance in embryonic development. This idea, 
which is remarkably close to Leduc’s theory of 
spontaneous generation, only begins to pervade the 
field of developmental biology. While one might 
consider that Leduc’s experimental data was 
insufficient to support such strong theoretical claims, 
his new physical approach was, as I will discuss now, 
consistent with the most recent and groundbreaking 
advances of developmental biology. In the following, I 
will provide three examples, meaningful because of 
their general character, among the many and growing 
number to choose from: the gastrulation of embryos, 
the formation of vertebrates’ body plan, and plants’ 
phyllotactic organization. 
 
Gastrulation - Gastrulation is an early phase of the 
embryonic development common to most animals. It is 
the archetypal process by which the blastula, a 
primitive hollow sphere of cells, folds into a layered 
structure to form the endoderm, the ectoderm, and the 
mesoderm, from which all internal organs will be 
formed. As amusingly coined by Lewis Wolpert, “It is 
not birth, marriage, or death, but gastrulation, which is 
truly the most important time in your life.” Recently, it 
was shown in Drosophila by Eric F. Wieschaus and 
collaborators that gastrulation highly relies on the 
hydrodynamic nature of the embryo, which transmits 
apical constrictions exerted by the cellular 
cytoskeleton to the rest of the tissue, and causes the 
passive inward flow of cells called invagination that 
eventually forms the mesoderm (He et al. 2014). This 
is in contrast with previous interpretations stating that 
genetically coordinated active cell shape changes 
should cause invagination. And indeed, additional 
experiments by the Wieschaus group showed that 
mutant individuals that do not form cells during the so-
called cellularization process still undergo 
invagination. Interestingly, the apical constriction that 
triggers the flow relies on genetic expression. Whether 
any crosstalk exists between the genetic activity that 
triggers constriction and the mechanical state (that is, 
tension, compression, or any deviation from the 
reference state) of the cells remains subject to debate, 
yet several papers point out that genes can be 
mechanosensitive (for a short review, see Jaalouk 
and Lammerdink 2009), in particular in this very 
system (Farge 2003, Brunet et al. 2013). Anecdotally, 
the fact that Wieschaus was awarded the Nobel Prize 
in 1995 for his earlier work on the control of 
embryogenesis by genetic signaling pathways reveals 
how much the spirit has recently changed in 
developmental biology. 
 
Body plan - The hydrodynamic, or more precisely, 
viscoelastic nature of cell and tissue movements has 
proven to be a powerful tool to study shape emergence 
in early embryogenesis. It was also utilized by Vincent 
Fleury and others as a framework to study the 
formation of the vertebrates’ body plan. The term “body 
plan” encompasses basic morphological features 
common to the animals of a phylum. Typically, these 
features can be symmetries, limb disposition, or 
segmentation of the main axis into repetitive segments 
(such as the vertebral column). It is largely unknown if 
the establishment of the body plan results from a 
nonlinear succession of “stop-and-go” genetic 
instructions, with no global routine, or if it somehow 
follows an “archetype”, as coined by Darwin himself. 
Fleury showed that basic viscoelasticity and mass 
conservation laws applied to the early embryo yield an 
hyperbolic symmetry breaking, that can be observed in 
the form of highly conserved hyperbolic tissue flows, 
and that results in the axial elongation of the embryo 
and in the four-limb symmetry observed in most 
vertebrates (Fleury 2012). This suggests that 
archetypes might indeed exist, as set by the formative 
laws of physics. Importantly, this should not be 
mistaken for the a posteriori selection of shapes that fit 
well the external physical constraints. It is rather the a 
priori restriction of developmental shapes to those 
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made accessible by the laws of physics: the space of 
shapes that are actually accessible to development is 
generated by the laws of physics, and consequently 
physical interactions can be said to be formative and 
to define the archetypes. 
 
Phyllotaxis - Phyllotaxis is the striking geometrical 
arrangement of plant organs along the stem. It has 
been observed centuries ago that leaves organize on 
the plant stem into spectacular spirals described by the 
famous mathematical suite of Fibonacci. Yet the 
mechanism by which they could do so has long 
challenged our understanding of plant development. 
German botanist Wilhelm Hoffmeister was the first to 
propose an organization rule that he believed might be 
sufficient to generate phyllotactic spirals: he proposed 
that primordia (new organ precursors) should 
periodically form at the growing tip where there is the 
most space available (Hoffmeister 1868). It took until 
the end of the 20th century and the work of Stéphane 
Douady and Yves Couder to refine Hoffmeister’s 
theory and to show that a simple inhibition rule 
between successive primordia (the appearance of new 
primordia being inhibited in the region of newly formed 
ones) was mathematically sufficient to spontaneously 
generate the Fibonacci spirals (Douady and Couder 
1992). Using this finding, they could mimic plant 
phyllotaxis in a purely physical experiment, much in 
Leduc’s spirit: successive drops of ferrofluid 
(mimicking the primordia) fall on a dish and are 
advected by a magnetic field generating repulsive 
forces between drops. And indeed the drops 
spontaneously arrange into Fibonacci spirals. They 
later showed that a variety of observed phyllotactic 
patterns were in fact different regimes of this simple 
mechanism (Douady and Couder 1996). The 
transport and accumulation of the hormone Auxin near 
newly formed primordia was later found to underlie 
growth inhibition (Reinhart 2003). Since then, the 
feedback between hormonal cues, phyllotactic 
patterns and tissue mechanics at the shoot meristem 
(the growing tip of the plant) has become an active field 
of investigation in plant development. Phyllotaxis 
nicely illustrates how simple interaction rules can force 
the spontaneous convergence of a system towards 
archetypal shapes, independent of genetic regulation 
or selection. 
 
 
Conclusion 
Stéphane Leduc’s legacy is not limited, I suggest, to 
his osmotic experiments, but rather encompasses his 
whole physical approach to the problem of 
organization in biology. Evelyne Fox Keller exhumed 
Leduc’s work to illustrate the historical role of physics 
in understanding the mechanisms of life (Keller 2002). 
Like Keller, I stress that Leduc’s theory has a 
significant importance in the history of our attempts at 
understanding life phenomena. Yet Keller, like Pierre 
Thuillier before her (Thuillier 1980), suggested that 
Leduc’s works are “illuminating in proportion to what 
may now appear to us as their absurdity” (Keller 2002, 
p.24). If indeed some of his claims might now seem 
outdated, he introduced the idea and some 
experimental evidence that the ordinary physical 
forces might intrinsically possess a power of 
organization susceptible to organize living matter 
during embryonic development. This concept was 
remarkably ahead of its time and, as I discussed, is 
akin to today’s bio-physical self-organization. 
Yet, Leduc’s theoretical contribution to biology fell into 
oblivion for a century or so. I suggest that this is mostly 
a consequence of our reluctance to adopt concepts 
and tools that are unspecific to life, because they 
threaten the specificity of living things –the vital 
exception; and therefore our own specificity. Just like 
Copernic when he introduced his heliocentric model 
instead of the commonly accepted geocentric model, 
Leduc and others had to fight an ideological resistance. 
The 20th century, the “century of the gene” as Evelyn 
Fox Keller has called it, has established genetics, a 
truly life-specific approach, as the framework of the life 
sciences. Remarkably easily and rapidly, the gene and 
the DNA strand have become popular icons of life and 
of our biological identity. Yet, the end of the 20th and 
the beginning of the 21st century have demonstrated 
the difficulty for the genetic paradigm to identify explicit 
mechanisms relating genetic information to physical 
traits. And most recent developments of biology, in 
particular in the field of embryogenesis, show that 
physical concepts inherited from Leduc or D’Arcy 
Thompson can help identifying these mechanisms. 
This conceptual change of spirit in modern biology 
might be a forerunner of a paradigm shift initiated more 
than a century ago. 
Finally, Leduc’s story bears witness to a rather 
paradoxical aspect of 19th and 20th century’s biology: 
How can biology be the science of life phenomena 
while avoiding the pitfall of the vital exception? A 
hundred years ago, Leduc stressed that physical 
methods should prevail over life-specific methods. The 
modern revival of physical approaches, often used 
beside now conventional genetic tools, might be rooted 
in the same need to address this paradox. 
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